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MISSING SPECIFICATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL SALES
ARTICLE 65 OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS
by Ralph Amissaht
A fundamental principle of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods1 is the recogni-
tion of the international character 2 of the transaction it regu-
lates. Cancellation of an international contract can impose
greater burdens than the typical domestic transaction. Accord-
ingly, the Convention contains a number of provisions designed
to help preserve the bargain the parties have made.3 Article 65
is one such provision. It states:
t Lecturer in "private law aspects of international trade", at The Law Faculty
of the University of Tromso, Norway. Editor of the International Trade Law Moni-
tor - <http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade-law/>.
1 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 Int'l Legal Mats. 668 1980 [hereinafter
CISG or Convention]. Official Records of the United Nations Conference on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, 10 March - 11 April, 1980 A/Conf. 97/19
[hereinafter Official Records]. The UN-certified English text is published in 52
Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264-6280 (Mar. 2, 1987).
2 As of February 1997, the international sales law consists of 47 Contracting
States: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-and-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador,
Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy,
Lesotho, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic
of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovania,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, United
States of America, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
3 Illustrated by the gap filling for price where none is agreed Article 55. Also
by the restricted grounds for avoidance of contract Articles 49, 64 and 73. Further
by such Articles providing remedies as 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52(2), and 65. Beyond
these Articles it may be described as pervasive throughout the Convention and
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(1) If under the contract the buyer is to specify the form, mea-
surement or other features of the goods and he fails to make
such specification either on the date agreed upon or within a
reasonable time after receipt of a request from the seller, the
seller may, without prejudice to any other rights he may
have, make the specification himself in accordance with the
requirements of the buyer that may be known to him.4
(2) If the seller makes the specification himself, he must inform
the buyer of the details thereof and must fix a reasonable
time within which the buyer may make a different specifica-
tion. If, after receipt of such a communication, the buyer fails
to do so within the time so fixed, the specification made by
the seller is binding.5
Since the discussion over its retention at the Vienna Confer-
ence, 6 Article 65 has generated little academic debate beyond
the commentaries in which it appears7 and even less "litiga-
tion."8 This paper examines the workings of the provision
through analysis of its key words. 9 It seeks to develop and sup-
plement an understanding of their meaning by reference to the
legislative history of this provision, scholarly writings on it and,
where possible, by analogy10 to other parts of the Convention.
manifested in the Convention's implied terms which provide the parties with an
agreement in the absence of their agreeing express terms.
4 CISG, supra note 1, art. 65. Italicization of keywords added by author.
5 CISG, supra note 1, art. 65.
6 The text of the Vienna Conference appears in Annex I of the Final Act of
the 1980 Vienna Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/19 (1980) [hereinafter Vienna
Conference].
7 Article 65 is historically tied to Article 67 of the Uniform Law for Interna-
tional Sales (ULIS) under the 1964 Hague Sales Convention and was Article 61 in
the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention. There was considerable discussion in the
Vienna Conference as to whether Article 61 of the Draft Convention should be
retained. See Vienna Conference, supra note 6. Suggestions included that it gave
the seller a privilege for which the buyer had no equivalent; that it was not in line
with existing trading practice, which gave adequate protection in the provisions
related to fundamental breach. For a comparison with the earlier ULIS text, see V.
Knapp, Specification by Seller, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 476 (C. M. Bianca & M. J. Bonell eds., 1987).
8 The word "litigation" encompasses reported arbitral proceedings as well.
9 The key statutory words are: "under the contract"; "form, measurement or
other features"; "reasonable time"; "receipt"; "may be known to"; "seller may";
"without prejudice"; and "binding".
10 For further reading on this subject see J. Helner, Gap Filling by Analogy -
Article 7 of the U.N. Sales Convention in its Historical Context, in FESTsKuFr TILL
LARS HJERNER, STUDIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 219 (Norstedts F6rlag, et al. eds.,
1990).
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CISG: ARTICLE 65
An attempt has been made to place Article 65 within the con-
text of the Convention as a whole.
Article 65 applies in circumstances where not all the details
related to the characteristics of the goods are fixed in the agree-
ment. It is agreed or assumed from the Article that the buyer
should specify the missing details later. The Article leaves no
doubt that the contract is formed without the details, which are
yet to be provided by the buyer.
Where the buyer fails to provide these specifications, the
Article facilitates the seller's ability to perform, providing a con-
venient mechanism for the seller to keep the contract alive by
laying down a procedure whereby the seller can ultimately sup-
ply the seller's own specifications." This enables the seller to
perform a contract that would otherwise have been too vague.
The Article protects the buyer by the obligations it places on the
seller who chooses to use the provision. 12 It also gives the buyer
every opportunity to make its own specifications, even after the
time that the buyer should have done S0.13 By allowing the fix-
ing of the goods in a specification sale, Article 65 may assist in
the determination of damages under Articles 74 to 77.14
UNDER THE CONTRACT
The buyer's obligation to set the specifications may be ex-
pressly stated in the contract or may arise under the contract
pursuant to Article 8 (interpretation of statements or other con-
duct of a party)15 or Article 9 (usages and practices applicable to
the contract). 16 The Secretariat Commentary appears to distin-
guish between a buyer's contract right to set the specifications
and contract obligation to set the specifications.' 7 Other com-
mentators do not so distinguish. Instead, they hold that a right
11 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 65(1).
12 See id. art. 65(2).
13 See id.
14 See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 74 to 77. For other reference to the role of
Article 65 in the context of its antecedent, Article 67 of the ULIS, see HANs DOLLE,
KoMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT 394 (1976). For specific references to
CISG Articles 74 and 75, see J. HONNOLD, Uniform Law for International Sales
Under the 1980 United Nations Convention 447 (2d ed. 1991).
15 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
16 See id. art. 9.
17 Secretariat Commentary, CISG Ann. art. 65, 5 (1993).
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to specify should be interpreted as an obligation to specify.' 8
The latter is the preferred view.
Article 65 only applies when a contract of sale has been con-
cluded. Under the Convention, for a proposal to be capable of
ripening into a contract, it must be "sufficiently definite." 19 A
prerequisite to a proposal ripening into a contract is that the
proposal must indicate the goods. 20 A general agreement that
the buyer should specify the goods required would be too broad
to qualify under Article 65 and "would have no legal effect."21
However, an indication of the goods without specifying their
"form, measurement or other features,"22 can be regarded as
sufficient. 23
FoRM, MEASUREMENT OR OTHER FEATURES
Intent 24 is the key to determining the scope of the phrase
"form, measurement or other features."25 Where the requisite
intent is present, this phrase is sufficiently wide to cover most
characteristics of the goods, including such matters as dimen-
sions, size, shape, style, version, model, aspects of design, color,
texture, hardness, quality, and technical details of the goods.
One commentator is of the view that:
When the contract states a fixed price, rather than a 'cost plus' or
similar formula, the parties probably would not intend that the
buyer's specifications should substantially affect the cost. Simi-
larly, the parties probably would not intend that the seller could
have wide discretion to decide the characteristics of the buyer's
goods. Consequently, references in the contract and in Article 65
to 'the form, measurements or other features of the goods' should
be construed with sufficient strictness to avoid these problems.26
18 Knapp, supra note 7, at 482. See also FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MAS-
KOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 249 (1992).
19 CISG, supra note 1, art. 14.
20 Knapp, supra note 7, at 477.
21 See id.
22 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 65.
23 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 17, 4.
24 For a definition of intent, see CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
25 CISG, supra note 1, art. 65(1).
26 HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 447-48.
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"REASONABLE TIME"
The phrase "reasonable time" appears in Article 65(1) and
(2).27 Article 65 provides that where the contract does not set
the date on which the buyer is to make the specification, the
seller may request him to make the specification within a "rea-
sonable time."28 If the seller proceeds to fix the specification
pursuant to Article 65(2), the buyer must be given a "reasonable
time" within which to make a different specification. 29 In either
instance, what is "reasonable" will vary depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case, including such factors as the location of
the parties and their known requirements.
No time is indicated by which the seller is to make his Arti-
cle 65(1) request, or by which the seller is to inform the buyer of
the details of a specification fixed by the seller pursuant to Arti-
cle 65(2). In either case it should be early enough, with respect
to the other obligations under the contract, to give the buyer
reasonable time within which to comply (or to make a different
specification), and for the seller subsequently to make
delivery.30
It has been said, with respect to the seller's Article 65(1)
request:
Where the seller invites the buyer only when the contract is near-
ing his performance, the period will be a short one for the buyer
could adapt himself to the specification ever since the conclusion
of the contract; and the mechanism regulated here cannot be
abused so as to grant him additional options for observing the
market situation to the detriment of the seller.31
With respect to the seller's Article 65(2) notice, it has been said
that the reasonable time "will be a short time in general be-
cause the buyer is already in breach of contract and he is only
required to make a decision."32 With respect to the time in
which the seller is to act, "[t]he seller should specify early
enough to leave the buyer a reasonable time to react before
27 CISG, supra note 1, art. 65.
28 See id. art. 65(1).
29 See id. art. 65(2).
30 See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 18, at 250.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 252.
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manufacture must commence. Where this is no longer possible,
the seller will reflect on whether he exercises his right at all."33
RECEIPT
The word "receipt" also appears in Article 65(1) and (2). 3 4
The general rule under Part III of the Convention states that "if
any notice, request or other communication is given or made by
a party... by means appropriate in the circumstances, a delay
or error in the transmission of the communication or its failure
to arrive does not deprive that party of the right to rely on the
communication." 35 This rule does not apply to either a request
under Article 65(1) or a notice of specification made by the seller
pursuant to Article 65(2). In either case, to be effective, the com-
munication must be received by the buyer.36 This places an ad-
ded burden on the seller 37 who must be assured that the
communication has been received. 38
33 See id. at 251.
34 CISG, supra note 1, art. 65.
35 See id. art. 27.
36 The two general rules on effective communications relate to dispatch (Part
II, CISG, supra note 1, art. 24) and to receipt (Part III, CISG, supra note 1, art. 27).
Receipt as used here is regarded as analogous to its definition and use in Part II.
Article 24 which applies to Part II of the Convention determines for that Part
when a communication "reaches" the person to whom it is addressed. See HON-
NOLD, supra note 14, at 249. It is persuasively argued that it should be applied by
analogy to the exceptions to the dispatch rule applied in Part III of the Convention.
See HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 250. This results in a consistent solution for the
definition of receipt within the Convention and means that the much greater detail
existing on receipt in relation to Article 24 can be applied here. See, e.g., the Offi-
cial Records of the prior uniform law, ULIS, p. 26.
Because a communication that 'reaches' the addressee when it is delivered
to his place of business or mailing address . . . will have legal effect even
though some time may pass before the addressee ... knows of it ... even
thought the addressee may not know of its delivery. (Secretariat Com-
mentary, paragraphs 3 and 4), a prudent response to application of Article
24 concepts to Part III of the Convention is the use of a contract clause
which identifies by position title, parties to whom notices or other commu-
nications must be sent.
A. KRITZER, 1 INT. CONTRACT MAN., 193 (1994).
37 Burden of proof and other procedural issues are traditionally for the deter-
mination of the domestic court; further discussion is outside the scope of this
paper.
38 A German court has added a further definition to the Convention's term
"reaches." See Amstergericht Kehl 6 October 1995 (3C 925/93) Wirtschaftsrech-
tliche Beratung (Minchen) 1996, 398. There, the court held that to "reach" the
addressee, the communication should be in the addressee's language. Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol9/iss1/8
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Although the general rule on communications does not ap-
ply to the seller's communications made pursuant to Article 65,
it does apply to the buyer's responses to such communications.
A delay or error in the transmission of the response, or its fail-
ure to arrive, does not deprive the buyer of the right to rely on
it, as long as the response was made by means appropriate in
the circumstances. 39
MAY BE KNOWN To
The right to request the buyer to make the specification is
beneficial to the seller because it has "teeth." If the buyer fails
to make the specification, the seller may do so. 4° However,
whether it will be prudent for the seller to take advantage of
this right will depend on the circumstances. In the normal situ-
ation, the request alone should produce the response desired.
When it does not, the reasons may range from the buyer who
does not care as to the unspecified form, measurement or other
features of the goods that he has ordered to the recalcitrant
buyer who no longer desires to consummate the contract.
In the latter case, the rule that the seller can only make the
specification unilaterally in accordance with the requirements
of the buyer that "may be known to." the seller can present diffi-
culties. These difficulties stem from the meaning of the phrase
"may be known to." Controversy can be associated with the
dimensions of this phrase and what the seller knows or may be
presumed to know.
Elsewhere within the Convention there are several refer-
ences to knowledge and awareness which express different gra-
dations of the requirement.4 ' The words "may be known to,"
and the circumstances in which they are used, allow appropri-
39 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 27.
40 See id. art. 65.
41 Provisions on anticipatory breach and installment contracts contain three
gradations of knowledge: "is clear that" (CISG, supra note 1, art. 72); "gives good
grounds to conclude" (Id. art. 73); and "becomes apparent that" (see id. art. 71).
Elsewhere, the Convention contains other gradations of knowledge: "knew" (see id.
at arts. 31(b) and 43(2)); "known to" (see id. at arts. 9(2), 10(a), and 35(2)(b)); "is
aware of' (CISG, supra note 1, art. 69(2)); "knew or could not have been unaware
of' (see id. at arts. 8(1), 35(3), 40, 42(1) and 42(2)(a)); "knew or ought to have
known" (see id. at arts. 9(2), 38(3), 49(2)(b)(i), 64(2)(b)(i), 68, 74 and 79(4)); "has
become aware or ought to have become aware of' (see id. art. 43(1)); and "discov-
ered or ought to have discovered" (see id. art. 82(2)(c)).
19971 245
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ate application of the tests provided by Article 8 (intent)42 and
Article 9 (usages)43 in defining the scope of this phrase:
The requirements of the buyer that the seller may be pre-
sumed to know and take into account with respect to the setting
of specifications include the intent of the buyer that the seller is
expected to have understood, as determined through applica-
tion of Article 8, and any relevant usages that the seller should
have taken into account as defined by Article 9.
Articles 8 and 9 are contained in Part I, General Provisions,
and permeate the Convention. An argument may be made that
they should be applied directly to what the seller may be pre-
sumed to know when making the specifications. In any event,
the circumstances in which "may be known to" is used within
Article 65 make appropriate a closely analogous understanding
to Articles 8 and 9, with much the same result: a uniform inter-
pretation of Article 65 that is in accordance with the general
principles on which the Convention is based.44
Article 8 applies to pre-contract and post-contract commu-
nications and actions, which communications are similarly rele-
vant under Article 65. Both the subjective and objective tests
provided by Article 8 are relevant. Under Article 8(1) what the
seller is asked is whether the seller "knew or could not have
been unaware" of information which impacts upon the specifica-
tion the seller is to make.45 There are two parts to this stan-
dard. The first is "Could not have been unaware." Of what a
party "could not have been unaware," it has been suggested that
this "does not [impose] an express obligation to conduct relevant
research."46 The second is "What may be known." Similarly,
what "may be known to" the seller, has been said to require
knowledge or a strong assumption of knowledge on the part of
the seller, so that a seller "may have known" requirements of
the buyer that the seller is presumed to know, having been in a
good position to learn them.47 It is said that although this "does
42 CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
43 See id. art. 9.
44 See id. art. 7.
45 See id. art. 8(1).
46 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 18, at 170.
47 See id. at 251.
[Vol. 9:239
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not require the seller ... to make efforts to obtain such knowl-
edge... [the seller] must not ignore clues."48
The objective tests in Article 8(2) and (3) offer further
assistance in defining the scope of what the seller is to be re-
garded as having known or understood from communications
with the buyer (providing a measure of the comprehension ob-
jectively expected of the seller with regard to any "clues").49 Ar-
ticle 8(2) applies whenever it is not possible to apply Article
8(1). This suggests that, based on the buyer's communication to
the seller, the seller should have the understanding of "a rea-
sonable person of the same kind [as the seller] . . . in the same
circumstances." 50 Article 8(3) states that in determining the de-
gree of "understanding a reasonable person would have had,
due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of
the case including the negotiations, any practices which the
parties have established between themselves, usages and any
subsequent conduct of the parties.51 Where there is a usage of
which the seller should take account in making his specifica-
tion, the formulation in Article 9 which uses the words "knew or
ought to have known"52 should be applied.
Distinguishing the formulations in Article 8 and 9, it has
been commented that "'Could not have been unaware' appears
close to actual knowledge. It can be contrasted with 'ought to
have known' or 'discovered' which is used in several other provi-
sions of the Convention .... While the latter formula appears
to impose a duty to investigate the former may not . . . 53 It
has also been suggested that in accordance with the principle of
good faith, the seller is obligated to take into consideration
"probable or presumed needs of the buyer;" and that the seller
cannot, for example, take the chance of specifying non-stylish
goods "when he is aware of fashion trends in the buyer's coun-
48 See id.
49 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
50 See id. art. 8(2).
51 See id. art. 8(3). As of particular interest, and beyond the scope of this pa-
per, other commentaries on the Convention should be examined for further eluci-
dation with respect to the scope of Article 8.
52 CISG, supra note 1, art. 9.
53 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: New Zealand's Proposed Acceptance, Report No. 23 of the Law Commission
40 (1992). For the text of this report, see Introductions to the CISG, supra note 38.
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try, even when he is not informed of the concrete needs of the
buyer."54
That a party in the sale of goods has responsibility for the
acts or omissions of his "employees"5 5 may be stated to be a
tenet of the Convention and perhaps further as lex mercatoria56
for international sales. This may be assumed from the discus-
sion of the formulation of the text for Article 80 of the words "by
his own act or omission"57 where it was concluded that no addi-
tional provision was necessary to include "persons whom that
party may employ in the performance of the contract" as it was
universally accepted that such "employees" would be included
by reference to the party.58
This must also apply to the knowledge of such employee or
agent, either:
1. By an analogous presumption applied to the knowledge of em-
ployees. The seller and his relevant employees being regarded
as a single entity. Such employees being understood to be cov-
ered within the meaning of the word "seller". Thereby imput-
ing upon the seller all the knowledge of his employees who are
part of the transaction; or
54 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7. This Article is concerned with the interpretation
of the Convention. To apply here, the principle of good faith would be used in the
interpretation of the scope that should be attributed to the words "known to" as
used in Article 65. In addition to this there is a growing use of good faith and
loyalty principles in relation to the Convention and international sales. Id. For
references to building a good faith requirement into international sales contracts
and loyalty to the other party to the contract as a general principle of the Conven-
tion, see, for the former, J.A. Manwaring, Reforming Domestic Sales Law: Lessons
to be learned from the International Sale of Goods in ACTES DU COLLOQUE SUR LA
VENTE INTERNATIONALE 146 (Peret and Lacasse eds., 1989); and, for the latter, Leff
Sev6n reported in J. Honnold, Einheitliches Kaufrecht und Nationales Obligation-
enrecht, in UNIFORM WORDS AND UNIFORM APPLICATION. THE 1980 SALES CONVEN-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL PRACTICE 139-40 (Peter Schlechtriem ed.,
1987).
55 Employees, as used in this article, refers to persons engaged by the party in
the performance of the contract.
56 Lex mercatoria is defined as the law merchant; commercial law. See
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
57 CISG, supra note 1, art. 80.
58 Exchange between Professors Rognlien (Norway - who raised the question),
Maskow (German Democratic Republic), Michida (Japan), Khoo (Singapore),
Loewe (Austria - Chairman), Shafik (Egypt). Summary Records of the First
Comm., U.N. Conf on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of Goods, 37th mtg., Agenda
Items 87 and 88, at 430, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.97/C.1/SR.37 (1980).
248 [Vol. 9:239
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2. By direct application of the principle - of the seller having re-
sponsibility for the acts and omissions of employees involved
in the transaction. Where the seller is unaware of relevant
knowledge possessed by his "employees" this can be regarded
as an omission on the part of the seller for which the seller is
responsible. The seller should thus act to ensure that he pos-
sesses relevant information known to his "employees" before
making the specification himself.
The former imposes a more strict responsibility. The seller can-
not excuse itself from failure to discover some obscure item of
information provided by the buyer to the seller's employee,
which may not on its own appear to be significant, and, of
which, on the latter formulation, the seller may be able to avail
itself in some circumstances. This could be unduly harsh on a
long drawn-out transaction involving several individuals on
both sides, or the seller's side.
Given the safeguards provided the buyer within Article 65,
the latter interpretation should be sufficient. In either event, it
is clear that, with respect to "employees", 59 the seller is under
an obligation at the very least, to investigate what they know
about the buyer's requirements that is relevant to the specifica-
tion the seller makes. However, the seller who did not actually
know and could not have known the buyer's requirements, is
not bound to consider them. Determination of what "may be
known to" the seller is a question of evidence and appraisal of
the circumstances. 60
If the seller avails himself of Article 65, on failure to make
specifications in accordance with the provisions of Article 65,
the seller is himself in breach of contract. 61 The remedies avail-
able to the buyer are all those that may be relevant in the cir-
cumstances as resulting from the seller's breach.62 Where the
seller does not take into account requirements which "may be
59 Supra note 55.
60 See supra text accompanying note 37.
61 This includes in addition to the setting of specifications, the provision of
notices and giving of reasonable time. It has been suggested that where the seller
fails to take into account the requirements of the buyer the specification made will
not be binding. Knapp, supra note 7, at 479. F. Enderlein & D. Maskow conclude
otherwise and are consistent with the view expressed here. See ENDERLEIN & MAS-
KOW, supra note 18.
62 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 45(1). Avoidance, as a remedy, is only available
in the limited circumstances provided by the Convention.
1997]
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known to" him, and subsequently delivers goods, such goods
would be regarded as non-conforming goods. 63 Also, in consid-
ering evidentiary issues, the seller must be mindful of the Con-
vention's "informality principle," pursuant to which evidence of
such knowledge need not be confined to written
communications. 64
SELLER MAY
The seller's right to use the remedy prescribed by Article 65
is a discretionary one, the seller is under no obligation to do so.
However, whether the seller does or does not use the remedy,
the seller must take into account the consequences for mitiga-
tion of loss. 65 Several factors will influence the seller's decision
as to whether to utilize the provision. Practical considerations
will be important, including: the time available for performance
under the contract; the seller's appraisal of the buyer's commit-
ment to the contract; the certainty of payment under the con-
tract; and any implications for future business relations.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Action under Article 65 is "without prejudice" to other rem-
edies available to the seller. Damages are the typical remedy
sought for breach of contract. For the seller to assert his right
to damages 66 he "must take such measures as are reasonable in
the circumstances to mitigate the loss."67
63 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 35 (especially §§ (1)and (2)(b)).
64 The informality principle provides that "sales contracts are not subject to
any formal requirements" as applied to Articles 8(3), 11 and 29. See J. Rajski
Form of Contracts, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw: THE 1980
VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 121 (C. M. Bianca & M. J. Bonell eds., 1987).
65 Literally, the sole consequence Article 77 imposes for non-mitigation of loss
is the reduction of an otherwise applicable claim for damages. See CISG, supra
note 1, art. 77. On the other hand, resort to Article 7(2), general principles of the
Convention, can likely lead to an expanded obligation to mitigate one's loss. Id.
art. 7(2). A basis for such a broader obligation would be the reading into the Con-
vention of a general principle of "loyalty to the other party to the contract." See
Sev6n supra note 54. For a further reference to the principle of loyalty to the other
party, see Peter Schlechtriem, Recent Developments in International Sales Law, 18
ISRAEL L. REV. 309, 320-21 (1983).
66 CISG, supra note 1, arts. 61 and 74, 75 or 76.
67 See id. art. 77. The Secretariat Commentary makes it clear that specifying
a vessel can be a mitigation obligation of the seller in cases of delivery of the goods
FOB INCOTERMS (free on board in compliance with terms) when the buyer de-
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The setting of specifications can also have a bearing on the
seller's right to obtain specific performance under Article 62,68
or to avoid the contract under Article 64.69 In the case of spe-
cific performance, Article 65 is designed to assist in the preven-
tion of the buyer escaping its obligations by refusing to supply
missing specifications when contractually bound to do so. How-
ever, an attempt to use Article 65 as a device for making the
buyer perform his part of the contract in circumstances in
which he is reluctant or refuses to do so, will in practice seldom
be the most beneficial legal solution for the seller. In these cir-
cumstances, Article 65 leaves room for the buyer to raise com-
plicated questions of evidence and appraisal.
The fact pattern that leads to examination of Article 65
(buyer's non-compliance with his obligation to specify the form,
measurement or other features of the goods) can also be cross-
referenced to Article 80 as such a non-compliance by the buyer
can be a defense to allegations of non-performance on the part
of the seller. Other cross-references to consider are Articles 71
and 72. The buyer's non-compliance can have a bearing on a
seller's right to suspend performance and to determine whether
there has been an anticipatory breach of contract.
BINDING - ARTICLE 65 AND ITS INTERACTION WiTH THE RIGHT
TO AVOID. SPECIAL ISSUES
Article 65 confers an optional right70 on the seller to make
his own specifications and keep the contract alive.71 Further-
more, Article 65 is to operate without prejudice to the seller's
other rights.72 Where the seller chooses not to perform by mak-
ing his own specifications, but instead makes a request that the
buyer should perform, under Article 62, the breach may eventu-
faults on his obligation to name the vessel. Secretariat Commentary, supra note
17, art. 62, 9. The same principle would apply to specifications as to the nature
of the goods under fact patterns encompassed by Article 65.
68 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 62.
69 Id. art. 64. For a fuller discussion of such matters and of"Nachfrist" issues
under Article 63 see ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 18, at 240-41, and A.
Kritzer, supra note 36, at 499-507.
70 The optional right is indicated by use of the word "may". See CISG, supra
note 1, art. 65(1).
71 See id. art. 65(1).
72 See id. art. 65.
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ally become fundamental, if the buyer refuses to perform. 73 The
"without prejudice" language of Article 65 appears to indicate
that it is not intended to affect any other available remedies,
including the right to avoid the contract. Despite this, taking
the Convention as a whole and the integral working of its provi-
sions, it would appear that exercise of seller's rights under Arti-
cle 65 can affect the seller's right to avoid the contract. This
area is complicated because Article 65 is designed to assist per-
formance of the contract, not its avoidance. Put simply, the abil-
ity for the seller to make a binding specification in Article 65 is
not synonymous with performance, nor is it necessarily re-
garded by the seller as making an election to perform. 74 Yet,
prior to use of Article 65, the seller may be entitled to avoid the
contract should the buyer not supply the missing specifications;
and after application of the Article, this right to avoid may be
lost. 75
One caveat is that the phrase "without prejudice to any
other rights" does not necessarily mean that a failure to exer-
cise this optional remedy will not prejudice a party's ability to
exercise still another right. As an example, like Article 65, Arti-
cle 63 provides an optional remedy76 (in that case, the CISG's
"Nachfrist"-type remedy).7 7 In that setting, a court has indi-
73 See id. art. 62. An exception to this is where, looking to the intent of the
parties (Article 8), it is clear that the selection is of no importance to the buyer.
See id. art. 8. In this circumstance, the seller is obliged to supply the goods as
required under Article 35 of the Convention. See id. art. 35.
74 The remedy in Article 65 provides the mechanism for supplying missing
specifications consequently making performance possible. This is distinct from
performance. The language used appears to indicate that Article 65 is not meant to
be inconsistent or to interfere with the right to avoid. Specifically, one might as-
sume (mistakenly as it turns out) that no election is being made at the time of
using Article 65 to perform (i.e., not to avoid) and that the words within the Article
"without prejudice to any other rights" include the remedy of avoidance of contract
if then available.
75 For example, see Official Records supra note 1, at 51-52. Other commenta-
ries, however, point out the incompatibility of the two remedies. Enderlein & Mas-
kow conclude "[tihe seller has no obligation to make the specification himself
... [i]f he specifies, nevertheless, he insofar removes for himself the right to avoid
the contract." ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 18, at 251.
76 CISG, supra note 1, art. 63.
77 Involving the fixing of an additional period within which to perform an obli-
gation that is due. In the case of payment of the price and taking delivery, failure
to perform after this additional time permits the seller to avoid the contract, under
Article 64(1)(b). For a discussion of "Nachfrist" issues under Article 63, see EN-
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cated that failure to exercise this optional remedy prejudiced a
buyer's ability to avoid the contract. 78 There can be circum-
stances in which a similar logic may be applied to a seller's fail-
ure to exercise the optional remedy provided under Article 65.
FUNDAMENTAL BREACH AND AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT UNDER
ARTICLE 64(1)(A) OR ARTICLE 72
The problem concerns the relationship between the provi-
sions of Article 65 being "without prejudice to any other rights"
and those defining fundamental breach 79 and the consequen-
tially available remedies.80 Where the breach is "fundamental,"
it gives the seller the right to avoid the contract.8 ' The buyer's
initial failure to make a specification will not amount to a fun-
damental breach unless the seller is deprived of what he is enti-
tled to expect under the contract.8 2 This can only happen where
time is, for whatever reason, essential to the seller.
On their natural meaning, the words "without prejudice to
any other rights" in Article 65(1) might seem to apply to the
whole of Article 65 and the remedy it provides. For this to be
true, the seller would have to be entitled to avoid even after the
seller's specification has become binding under the Article.
Whether this is possible, will depend on the way in which Arti-
cle 65 operates in relation to a fundamental breach as defined in
the Convention.8 3 If the effect of the breach is to be looked at in
the light of the seller's specifications having become binding,
and, thus, enabling the seller to perform, the breach will not be
fundamental.8 4 The result is that "without prejudice" to the
seller's other rights, as used in Article 65 with respect to avoid-
DERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 18, at 240-241. For a detailed analysis of Article
63, see A. KRITZER supra note 36, at 499-507.
78 Amtsgericht Oldenburg in Holstein (Germany) 24 April 1990, IPRax (1991)
336. See UNCITRAL abstract reported in A/CN.9/SER.C/Abstracts 1 (19 May
1993) [CLOUT abstract no. 7]. For related data on this case, see Case Presentation
dated April 1997 <http-//www.cisg.law.pace.edu>.
79 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25, for a definition of fundamental breach.
80 See id. art. 61 for available remedies.
81 See id. arts. 64(1)(a) and 72.
82 See id. art. 25.
83 See id.
84 In the case of the reluctant buyer (not unlikely, given his refusal to co-oper-
ate), it may be regarded as an element of anticipatory breach under Article 72. See
CISG, supra note 1, art. 72.
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ance of the contract, is confined to the seller putting into motion
the apparatus for making a binding specification, and no longer
applies once these specifications have become binding.8 5
AVOIDANCE OF CONTRACT UNDER ARTICLES 63 AND 64(1)(B)
The Secretariat Commentary suggests, with respect to fac-
tual circumstances to which Article 65 would apply, that one of
the alternatives includes that under Article 63 the seller may
"fix an additional period of reasonable length for the buyer to
perform his obligation," 6 and on his subsequent non-perform-
ance, the seller may avoid under Article 64(1)(b).8 7 The obliga-
tion to which Article 64(1)(b) refers is restricted to the buyer's
obligation to "perform his obligation to pay the price or take de-
livery of the goods." 8 To extend it to the buyer's obligation to
provide specifications as part of the buyer's "obligation to ...
take delivery of the goods"8 9 would put a strained construction
on the wording of Article 64(1)(b), which singles out and limits
its scope to the two primary obligations of the buyer, namely,
payment and delivery. 90 Indeed several authors regard the
Commentary to be in error on this point.91
Clearly, an argument against the right to avoid after the
fixing of an additional time is that a minor breach of contract
should not be made fundamental by the setting of a deadline.
However, without Article 65 it is likely that a similar effect will
85 An alternative interpretation of "without prejudice to any other rights he
may have", as used in Article 65, is that it applies to the seller's use of those speci-
fications even after they become binding. This interpretation must be incorrect.
At this stage where the seller is in a position to perform a binding contract, he
must do so or be in breach of contract. The exception is where, along with other
factors, the buyer's non-co-operation can be taken to indicate that the buyer "will
not perform a substantial part of his obligations" or as amounting to an anticipa-
tory fundamental breach of contract. On making a specification under Article 65,
the seller will similarly be bound to perform should the buyer provide an alterna-
tive specification under paragraph 2 sentence 1. For more on the above reasoning,
see ENDERLEIN & MASKOw, supra note 18, at 251.
86 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 17, art. 63 1.
87 See id. [ 7.
88 CISG, supra note 1, art. 64(1)(b).
89 See id.
90 Secretariat Commentary, supra note 17, art. 64 [ 6.
91 See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 7, at 478 and ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra
note 18, at 251 (the reference to Article 64(1) in the Secretariat Commentary is
inaccurate). But see J. HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 440 and 448.
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eventually result (the seller being entitled to avoid for funda-
mental breach), unless it is possible for the seller also to per-
form without the aid of Article 65, as argued above.
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